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In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the
cortical midline structures (CMSs) is implicated in what has been termed self-related
processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and
self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should
distinguish between being a self (i.e., being a subject of conscious experience) and being
aware of being a self (i.e., being able to think about oneself as such). While the former
consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability to
explicitly represent one’s own perspective as such. Further, we should distinguish between
being aware of oneself “as subject” and being aware of oneself “as object.” The focus of
existing studies investigating the relation between CMS and self has been predominantly
on the ability to think about oneself (and in particular thinking of oneself “as object”),
while the more basic aspects involved in being a self have been neglected. However, it is
important to widen the scope of the cognitive neuroscience to include the latter, not least
because this might have important implications for a better understanding of disorders of
the self, such as those involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so, cognitive neuroscience
should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology. Second, we need to
distinguish between personal and subpersonal level explanations. It will be argued that
although it is important to respect this distinction, in principle, some subpersonal facts can
enter into constitutive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order for this
to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analysis and knowledge about relevant
cognitive mechanisms.
Keywords: self-consciousness, consciousness, corticalmidline structures, phenomenology, schizophrenia, personal
level, subpersonal level
INTRODUCTION
Self-consciousness is a topic that is one of the classical concerns
of philosophy. More recently, it has also begun to take center stage
in cognitive science studies, including neuroimaging studies. In
particular, in recent years there has been increasing evidence that
an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures (CMSs)
is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This
article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS
and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical
distinctions.
After briefly summarizing what is known to-date about the
relation between the self and CMS and raising some general con-
cerns regarding the attempt to localize the self in the brain, it will
first be argued that we should distinguish between being a self (i.e.,
being a subject of conscious experience) and being aware of being a
self (i.e., being able to think about oneself). While the former con-
sists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter
requires the ability to explicitly represent one’s own perspective as
such. This, in turn, requires an awareness of other minds, and the
ability to contrast one’s own perspective with that of others. It will
be argued that the focus of existing studies investigating the rela-
tion between CMS and self has been predominantly on the ability
to think about oneself, while the more basic aspects involved in
being a self have been neglected. It will be argued further that it is
important to widen the scope of cognitive neuroscience to include
the latter, not least because this might have important implications
for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as those
involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so,cognitive neuroscience
should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology.
It will also be argued that we should distinguish between thinking
of oneself “as subject” and thinking of oneself “as object” and that
it might be interesting to target this distinction in future empirical
studies.
Second, the article will ask what and how exactly (if any-
thing) the study of CMS can teach us about self-consciousness.
It will be argued that we need to distinguish between personal
and subpersonal level explanations. At the personal level we refer
to a person’s conscious experience and mental states in order
to make intelligible the behavior of a person by providing the
reasons the person might have for acting in the way that they
do. Subpersonal level explanations on the other hand provide
information about the physiological or computational enabling
conditions of personal-level phenomena. Properties at the sub-
personal level are neither conscious, nor do they make reference
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to mental states or reasons. This raises the question as to how we
should think of the relation between these two levels of explana-
tion. Can neuroscience only ever provide us with correlations or
causal relations between personal and subpersonal level phenom-
ena? Or can a brain state, such as a particular pattern of activation
in CMS, be part of the constitutive basis of being in a psycho-
logical state, such as a state of self-awareness? It will be argued
that, in principle, some subpersonal facts can enter into constitu-
tive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order
for this to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analy-
sis and knowledge about relevant cognitive mechanisms (such as
neurocomputational mechanisms).
THE SELF AND CORTICAL MIDLINE STRUCTURES
It seems that in recent years social cognitive neuroscience has
made much progress in identifying the neural correlates of self-
awareness. In particular, functional neuroimaging (fMRI) studies
have demonstrated the involvement of CMS, including the ventral
medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), dorsal MPFC (dMPFC), and
parietal/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), as well as the anterior
CMS (e.g., ACC) in self-related processing (e.g., Gusnard et al.,
2001; Kelley et al., 2002; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Platek
et al., 2004; Ochsner et al., 2005; Northoff et al., 2006; Yaoi et al.,
2009).
The involvement of CMS in the processing of self-related stim-
uli seems to be independent of the sensory domain in which the
self-related stimulus is being represented (e.g., auditory, visual,
mental), and of the task domain (e.g., verbal, spatial, memory,
emotional, facial, social, agency) used in any specific study. More
recently, a study by Moran et al. (2009) also found that CMS are
involved both in the explicit and implicit processing of self-related
stimuli, that is, in situations that involve self-relevant stimuli,
regardless as to whether subjects were asked explicitly to engage in
self-referencing.
Interestingly, the brain areas associated with the processing of
self-related stimuli seem to overlap with what has been called the
“default-mode network” of the brain. This network is thought to
be involved in the processing of self-generated stimuli (as opposed
to stimuli from the external world) and is thought by some to
instantiate “the self” (Gusnard et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 2003;
Schneider et al., 2008)1.
However, here, I want to raise some doubts regarding the
possibility of locating the self in the brain.
For one thing, it has been pointed out that the relevant studies
often do not adequately distinguish familiarity (i.e., the personal
familiarity with a place, person, or other stimulus, which may
elicit autobiographical memories or emotional reactions) from
self-relatedness (Gillihan and Farah, 2005), and between self-
specific and non-self-specific task demands (such as the recruit-
ment of attention or executive control functions, which might be
required in order to make evaluative or recognitional judgments)
(Legrand and Ruby, 2009). Specifically, Legrand and Ruby, 2009,
p. 270) argue that self-related tasks, which involve self-evaluative
1Though note that Schilbach et al. (2008) argue that activity in the default system
of the brain is intimately linked to a human predisposition for social cognition. The
relation between social cognition and self-awareness will be further discussed below.
judgments, are not self-specific, because “the evaluative processes
enabling identification, attribution, and reflection upon a subject
are not different for self and others.”
These concerns were partly addressed in a recent meta-analysis
by Qin and Northoff, 2011, p. 1223). The aim of this study was
to investigate “the relationship between brain activity related to
the processing of self-specific, personally familiar, and other (non-
self and non-familiar) stimuli,” while controlling for task- and
stimulus-dependent effects. The study demonstrated that there
is indeed overlap between the processing of self-related, other-
related, and familiar stimuli in several regions of the CMS (in
particular in the MPFC and PCC). However, the perigenual ante-
rior cingulate cortex (PACC) seems to be recruited specifically in
the processing of self-related stimuli, as well as during resting-state
conditions. The study also partly confirmed the hypothesis put for-
ward by Legrand and Ruby (2009) that general task demands (such
as those involved in evaluative and recognitional judgments) lead
to an activation of CMS (in particular MPFC and PCC/precuneus),
suggesting that such activation is not specific for the processing of
self-related stimuli. Again, the PACC seems to be exempt from this,
though Qin and Northoff (2011) point out that due to a lack of
control in the original studies their results are not conclusive with
respect to this point.
In sum, this meta-analysis suggests that the PACC seems to be
recruited specifically for the processing of self-related stimuli as
well as in resting-state activity, while other regions of the CMS,
such as the MPFC and the PCC are involved in the evaluation of
stimuli as well as in the processing of familiarity and the distinction
between self and other.
Moreover, other areas of the brain were also identified as being
involved in the processing of self-related stimuli. These include the
lateral prefrontal cortex and the left anterior insula. These areas
have also been suggested to be involved in self-referential processes
in previous studies (Keenan et al., 2001; Platek et al., 2008; Modinos
et al., 2009).
Taken together these results suggest some involvement of CMS
(in particular the PACC) in the processing of self-related stim-
uli. However, the results also indicate the involvement of CMS in
other processes, such as general (i.e., non-self-related) evaluative
or recognitional judgments, as well as the involvement of other
areas in self-related processing, thus raising doubts as to how spe-
cific the relation between CMS and self is. What this shows is that
we have to be very careful with regard to claims suggesting that the
self is “located” in particular areas of the brain.
Notice also that it is common in the literature on self and CMS
to equate self-related with self-specific processing (accordingly,
these two terms have been used somewhat interchangeably in this
section). However, as mentioned above, according to Legrand and
Ruby (2009), self-relatedness should be distinguished from self-
specificity. That is to say that on their view one should distinguish
between the process of judging a stimulus to be self-related and the
self-specifying functional processes that implement a self/non-self
distinction at a more fundamental level (and which provide the
basis for judgments of self-relatedness) (also, see Christoff et al.,
2011).
This distinction, which we will return to in the following, is
related to a more general concern regarding the attempt to locate
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the self in the brain, namely the fact that the phenomenon of self-
awareness is multi-faceted, involving, for example, the distinction
between being a self (i.e., being the subject of conscious experi-
ence) and being aware of being a self (i.e., possessing the ability to
think about oneself), as well as between synchronic and diachronic
aspects of self-awareness (where the former indicates awareness of
oneself at a given time and the latter awareness of oneself across
time), or between cognitive, agentive, and affective elements of
self-awareness. Given this multi-faceted nature, it is not surprising
that recent results shed doubt on the notion of a particular loca-
tion for “the self.” In fact, given the multi-faceted and complex
nature of the self and self-awareness, we should expect both self-
related and self-specific activity to be broadly distributed across
the brain, involving diverse affective and cognitive processes. In
the following section, I am going to take a closer look at the first
distinction – that is, the distinction between being a self and being
aware of being a self – with the aim of evaluating the implications
of this distinction for studies of the relation between CMS and
the self.
BEING A SELF vs. BEING SELF-AWARE
Within philosophy different notions of self and self-awareness can
be distinguished. One of the crucial distinctions on my view is
the distinction between being a self (i.e., being the subject of con-
scious experience) and being aware of being a self (i.e., being able
to think about oneself).
The former consists in having a first-person perspective on the
world, that is, a particular point of view. In contrast, the latter
consists in the ability to think about oneself as such, that is, to
explicitly represent one’s perspective as such. Thus, while the for-
mer can be characterized as being “world-directed,” the latter is
“self-directed.” The ability to think about oneself, in turn, requires
conceptual abilities, an awareness of other minds, and the ability
to contrast one’s own perspective with that of others (Musholt,
2012).
It is important not to conflate these two notions with each
other. For while it is reasonable to assume that every conscious
experience is experience from a subjective point of view, this sub-
jective point of view need not itself be part of the representational
content of experience. It is one thing to have a perspective on the
world (or to be aware of different ways in which one can interact
with the world), but it is quite another to be aware of having this
perspective (or to be aware of oneself as an agent) (Baker, 1998,
2012). In fact, it would put an unnecessary cognitive burden on
the organism to always represent its own perspective on the world.
Rather, precisely because an organism’s perception of the world is
always from its own perspective, this fact itself can “drop out” of
the content of conscious experience – the self can be thought of as
an “unarticulated constituent” (Perry, 1998) of experience. That is
to say that while perception contains implicitly self-related infor-
mation (for instance, the objects in one’s environment are always
presented in a certain distance and orientation from oneself), this
does not mean that the self is part of the explicit representational
content of experience (Musholt, 2013). The explicit representation
of one’s own perspective only becomes important once an organ-
ism has an understanding of the perspective of others and wants
to contrast its own perspective with that of others (Beckermann,
2003; Musholt, 2012). (This ability, in turn, can enable a host of
other important abilities, such as the ability to deceive as well as
the ability to cooperate by sharing intentions.) Accordingly, self-
consciousness and intersubjectivity can be regarded as two sides
of the same coin. Interestingly, some studies have found that some
parts of the CMS, as well as other areas of the brain, such as the
temporoparietal junction (TJP) are activated in the reflection on
both one’s own and the mental states of others (e.g., Mitchell et al.,
2005; Uddin et al., 2007; Lombardo et al., 2010).
That being said, the way we think about ourselves is not neces-
sarily the same as the way we think about others. Rather, following
a distinction introduced by Wittgenstein (1958), one can distin-
guish two-ways in which a subject can be self-aware. In one case,
the subject thinks of herself “as subject.” This is the case, for exam-
ple, when the subject experiences a mental state – such as a pain,
for example – and on the basis of this experience ascribes the
state to herself by using the first-person concept: “I have pain.”
Although mental state concepts, such as the concept “pain,” can be
applied both to self and other (reflecting a common conceptual
schema), each of us also has privileged access to their own pain
state. While I can ascribe pain to you by inferring from your behav-
ior or your facial expression that you must be in pain, I do not need
to rely on behavioral observation or inference in order to ascribe
pain to myself. Rather, the access to my pain is direct, immedi-
ate, and non-inferential. However, the subject can also think of
herself “as object,” that is, in the same way as she would think
of another (i.e., by adopting the perspective of another onto her-
self). For example, when the subject observes herself in the mirror
and ascribes to herself the property of being tall, she does this on
the same basis as she would in the case of another – in this case
by looking at herself. Self-ascriptions of the first kind have spe-
cial significance for self-knowledge, because they are often taken
to be “immune to error through misidentification relative to the
first-person pronoun” (Shoemaker, 1968). This is to say that when
ascribing properties to oneself by taking oneself “as a subject,” one
might be wrong with regard to the property one is self-ascribing,
but one cannot be wrong with regard to the subject of this self-
ascription – oneself. The reason for this is because the relevant
thought does not contain an identification component – I do not
need to identify myself in order to know that I feel pain (Evans,
1982). In contrast, when I look at myself in the mirror and judge
that I am tall, I am identifying the person that I see in the mir-
ror with myself. Hence, this thought is liable to error through
misidentification.
Note that these different types of self-representation are not
distinguished in terms of their content, but rather in terms of their
mode of presentation. When thinking of oneself “as subject” one
adopts a first-person mode of presentation, that is to say, a mode
that is specific to ways of gaining information about oneself (Perry,
2002; Recanati, 2012). In contrast, when thinking of oneself “as
object” one adopts a third-person mode of presentation, that is to
say a mode of presentation that is not specific to ways of gaining
information about oneself. In the former case the resulting self-
ascription will be immune to error through misidentification, as
no identification is required, whereas in the latter case it will not.
For example, I can ascribe a mental state, a certain belief state, say,
to myself either on the basis of my awareness of the mental state
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in question (from the first-person perspective), or on the basis
of adopting another’s perspective onto myself (from the third-
person perspective), for instance by reflecting of my past behavior
and concluding that I must have a certain belief without having
been aware of it. The content of the self-ascription will be the
same in both cases, namely “I believe x,” whereas the mode – the
basis upon which the self-ascription is made – will be different.
Similarly, I can judge that my legs are crossed either on the basis
of proprioceptive experience (from the first-person perspective)
or on the basis of looking at them in the mirror (from the third-
person perspective). Again, the content of the judgment “My legs
are crossed” will be the same in both cases, but the mode will be
different. In the first case my judgment simply makes explicit the
fact that proprioceptive information necessarily concerns the sub-
ject of experience – no self-identification is required. In the second
case, the subject identifies the image in the mirror with herself.
Thus, we should distinguish perspectivalness and other aspects
of subjectivity that constitute part of the structure of conscious-
ness as such (and that provide the basis for the ability to think
about oneself “as subject”), and specific types of conscious expe-
rience, namely experience or awareness of the self (where this is to
be understood in terms of explicit self-representation, or thinking
about oneself as such). Moreover, while the latter requires con-
ceptual abilities and is closely tied to our ability to ascribe mental
states to others, this is not say that the way in which we represent
or think about ourselves is necessarily the same in which we rep-
resent our think about others. Rather, we can distinguish between
thinking about oneself “as subject” (in the first-person mode) and
thinking about oneself “as object” (in the third-person mode).
The distinction between “being a self” and “being aware of
being a self” is related to the distinction between pre-reflective and
reflective self-awareness (e.g., Zahavi, 2005; Legrand, 2007a; also,
see Legrand, 2003, 2006). However, there are also important differ-
ences. For one thing, while the notion of possessing pre-reflective
self-awareness is largely equivalent to the notion of “being a self”
(i.e., being a subject of conscious experience), I prefer to reserve the
term “self-awareness” for the ability to refer to oneself in thought,
which, in turn, requires the ability to explicitly represent oneself.
However, this issue can largely be regarded as a terminological
matter for the purposes of this paper (for a detailed discussion, see
Musholt, 2013). More importantly, though, the notion of reflective
self-awareness is not quite the same as the notion of being aware of
being a self (i.e., the ability to think about oneself), because while
Legrand and others seem to think that reflective self-awareness
(and thus explicit self-representation, or thinking about oneself)
necessarily implies being aware of oneself “as object”(see in partic-
ular Legrand, 2007a), as I have argued above, one can think about
oneself (and thus explicitly represent oneself) either “as subject” or
as “object,” depending on whether the explicit self-representation
is based on a first-person mode of presentation (i.e., a way of gain-
ing information that is specific to the self), or on a third-person
mode of presentation (i.e., a way of gaining information that is not
specific to the self). Therefore, the three-way distinction between
being a self on the hand and representing or thinking about one-
self either “as subject” or “as object” on the other hand that I have
introduced here does not map exactly onto the two-way distinction
between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness.
Now, which of these notions (if any) are in play in studies
investigating the relation between CMS and the self?
Most of the relevant neuroimaging studies so far have relied
on the explicit judgments of self-relatedness. They usually involve
the presentation of personality traits which subjects have to rate as
being more or less self-related on a given scale. [Though note that
(Heinzel et al., 2006; Northoff et al., 2009; Qin and Northoff, 2011)
use a broader notion of self-relatedness which includes knowledge
of one’s own body, knowledge of psychological traits, and episodic
memory, as well as more generally the relationship to specific stim-
uli in the environment, such as the degree of personal relevance
and meaning attached to emotional pictures.] It seems clear that
in these kinds of studies what is being probed is (explicit) self-
consciousness. Participation in these studies requires subjects to
have a concept of themselves and to be able to reflect on questions
such as whether a certain personality trait belongs to them or not.
Even knowledge of one’s bodily features, psychological traits, and
memories requires the ability to think about oneself. Moreover,
insofar as specific stimuli are rated as being more or less self-
relevant or meaningful, they also need to be reflected upon and
to be put in relation to oneself – which, again, requires thinking
about oneself. Thus, it seems clear that by and large the studies
that are investigating the relation between CMS and the self are
investigating explicit self-awareness, and not the more basic aspect
of the subjectivity of conscious experience, of being a self or a sub-
ject of experience (cf. Legrand, 2003, 2007a; Legrand and Ruby,
2009; Christoff et al., 2011.) While recently, studies have begun to
address aspects of self-awareness that do not rely on explicit self-
reflection (Moran et al., 2009), these studies still rely on explicit,
conceptual knowledge about the self (such as knowledge about
personal semantic information).
What seems less clear is whether subjects who engage in this
task do so by thinking of themselves as they would of another
person (i.e., “as object”), or whether they think of themselves “as
subject.” In the case of exposure to emotional pictures, it seems
plausible that subjects think of themselves“as subject.”The picture
elicits a (more or less) intense emotional reaction, which the sub-
ject can then self-ascribe by means of introspection, that is, on the
basis of their experience. As subjects only have privileged access to
their own experiences in this way, this seems to be different from
the way in which they would think of someone else. On the other
hand, it might not always be apparent to me what emotional state
I am in, and I might in some cases have to rely on inference in
order to figure out what I am feeling – similar to when I am trying
to figure out the emotional state of someone else. However, in the
case of ascribing personality traits or bodily traits to oneself, the
subjects seem to think of themselves “as object.” In order to be
able to ascribe bodily traits to oneself, one needs to look at oneself,
as one would at another (for instance, by looking at a mirror or a
picture). Similarly, we often ascribe personality traits to ourselves
on the basis of what other people (such as friends or family) tell us
about ourselves, or by reflecting on past experiences and judging
our own behavior in light of what it tells us about our personal-
ity. Again, this way of thinking about oneself is not in principle
different from the way one would think about another.
What would be interesting is for future experiments to take
into account this distinction in order to try to find out whether
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and how the distinction between thinking of oneself “as subject”
and thinking of oneself “as object” is reflected in different pat-
terns of neural activation. In order to do, paradigms would have
to be developed to clearly distinguish between these two condi-
tions. That is, the paradigms in question would have to be able
to distinguish between judgments that are made based on ways of
gaining information that are specific to the self (such as judgments
made on the basis of the experience of a mental or bodily state)
and those that are made based on ways of gaining information that
are not specific to the self.
Although some studies have made first steps in that direction
(Ochsner et al., 2005; Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011), they do not
adequately distinguish between thinking of oneself “as subject”
and thinking of oneself “as object.” For example, Ochsner et al.
(2005) investigated the difference between direct and reflected
self-appraisals, where the former was supposed to tap into the
subject’s own beliefs about their traits, and the latter the subject’s
perception of how others view them. They found that different
judgment types all activated MPFC, though direct appraisals as
compared to reflected appraisals also recruited the posterior cin-
gulate, whereas reflected as compared to direct appraisals also
recruited the insula, orbitofrontal, and temporal cortex. While
these differences are interesting, note that the distinction between
direct and reflected self-appraisals is not the same as the distinction
between thinking of oneself “as subject” and thinking of oneself
“as object.” This is because even in direct self-appraisals the sub-
ject needs to make herself an object of self-reflection in order to
determine whether specific traits belong to herself. In contrast,
when the subject thinks of herself “as subject,” she self-ascribes
certain properties (such as the property of having a visual experi-
ence, feeling a pain or an emotion, or being an agent) in a direct,
non-inferential way, on the basis of exploiting the self-specifying
mechanisms that are implicit in conscious experience. In order
to do so, she need not make herself an object of self-reflection;
rather, she simply needs to apply the first-person concept in order
to make explicit the self-specifying information that is implicit
in her experience. (See below for further discussion of what this
self-specifying information might consist in.)
Another recent study by Jenkins and Mitchell (2011) studied
different types of self-reflection, namely reflection on one’s per-
sonality traits, reflection on current mental states, and reflection on
bodily characteristics. They found that there was a robust region
of MPFC that was more engaged when participants thought about
themselves than when they made judgments about another per-
son, regardless of the kind of self-reflection. They also found that
differences in type of self-reflection were reflected in other areas of
the brain, such as the TJP (for judgments of current mental states)
or the cerebellum (for judgments of physical traits). But notice
again that the different types of self-reflection studied here do not
reflect the distinction between thinking of oneself “as subject” and
thinking of oneself “as object.”This is because the different types of
self-reflection under investigation here are distinguished in terms
of their content. However, as I have argued above, the distinction
between thinking of oneself “as subject” and thinking of oneself
“as object” is not based on a difference in content, but rather on a
difference between modes of presentation. So while reflection on
one’s stable personality traits arguably requires thinking of oneself
“as object,” thinking about one’s current mental states might either
be based on direct experience of the latter (thinking of oneself “as
subject”), or on inferences similar to those employed in reason-
ing about the mental states of others. After all, as I pointed out
above, while we do have privileged access to some of our mental
states (for instance, I do not normally need to rely on inference
to know that I experience a pain), other mental states (such as
a slight feeling of irritation) might only become apparent when
I reflect on my recent behavior and infer that I must be feeling
irritable. Indeed, given that the experimental paradigm is based
on explicit self-reflection, it seems plausible that it will predom-
inantly be the latter – thinking of oneself “as object” – that is
being prompted here. Interestingly, Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011,
p. 216) found that “reflecting on one’s own current mental states
was specifically associated with activation in regions previously
linked to inferences about the mental states of others, including
medial parietal cortex and bilateral temporoparietal junction,” in
line with the thought that such self-reflection relies on processes
that are similar to reflecting on the mental states of others. This
is in line with previous findings as well (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005;
Uddin et al., 2007; Lombardo et al., 2010)2. Similarly, while reflec-
tion on my bodily traits will usually be an instance of thinking of
myself “as object,” I can also self-ascribe bodily properties (such
as the property of having my legs crossed) on the basis of pro-
prioceptive experience, and thus “as subject.” Thus, more research
is needed to specifically address the question whether the philo-
sophical distinction between thinking of oneself “as object” (in
the third-person mode) and thinking of oneself “as subject” (in
the first-person mode) is reflected in the neurobiology.
Moreover, it would also be interesting to enlarge the scope of the
neurocognitive study of the self to include the more basic aspects
of the subjectivity of conscious experience, of being a self or a
subject of experience, rather than focusing on the ability to think
about oneself alone (cf. Legrand, 2003, 2006, 2007a,b; Legrand
and Ruby, 2009; Christoff et al., 2011). Again, while these are
to be distinguished from explicit self-awareness (in the sense of
thinking about or representing oneself), they provide the basis
for the ability to think first-person thoughts “as subject” (i.e.,
first-person thoughts that are immune to error through misiden-
tification). Moreover, while there is no reason to think that these
basic aspects of being a self will also be related to CMS activity,
as they arguably constitute a structural feature of all conscious
experience and interaction with the world, they are nonetheless an
important aspect of our understanding of the self3. As mentioned
in the previous section, recently, Legrand and Ruby (2009) and
Christoff et al. (2011) have suggested that these are instantiated by
self-specifying processes, which implement what they call a func-
tional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition,
2Though notice that since the ascription of mental and bodily states to oneself and
to others (or to oneself “as object” and “as subject”) will always rely on a common
conceptual schema (despite differences in mode of presentation), we should always
expect some overlap between judgments involving the same concepts.
3Indeed, as Christoff et al. (2011) point out, it is likely that the widespread assump-
tion that the self is “instantiated” by the default-network of the brain will be called
into question if we expand the scope of the empirical study of the self. For it will be
precisely in interactions with the external world that the more basic aspects of being
a self will come into focus. Also see Legrand (2007a).
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and emotion4. After all, in order to be able to engage and interact
with the environment, an organism must be able to (implicitly)
distinguish between afferent signals arising as a result of the organ-
ism’s own efferent processes (i.e., reafference signals) and afferent
signals arising as a result of environmental events (i.e., exafference
signals) (see, e.g., Christoff et al., 2011, p. 105). The sense in which
the self is specified by means of these processes is as a subject of
perception, emotion, and cognition, as well as an agent – hence
they can provide the basis for thinking of oneself “as subject,” that
is, in the first-person mode.
Notice though that while Christoff et al. (2011), as well as
Legrand and Ruby (2009) and Legrand (2006, 2007a) take these
processes of implicit self-specification to result in a type of self-
experience or self-awareness, as mentioned above, I would prefer
to reserve this term for the ability to explicitly represent the
self. While self-specifying processes are doubtlessly involved in
processes of perception, action, cognition, and emotion at the sub-
personal level, this does not imply that the self is represented in
the content of experience at the personal level (and on my view
the latter is required for genuine self-awareness; see Musholt, 2013
for detailed discussion). But setting aside this largely terminologi-
cal issue, I agree with Legrand (2003, 2006, 2007a,b), Legrand and
Ruby (2009), and Christoff et al. (2011) that insofar as both the
study of the subjectivity of conscious experience and of the ability
to represent oneself in thought are important avenues of research,
one should not unnecessarily restrict the cognitive neuroscience of
the self to the latter alone. Rather, one should attempt to study both
of these aspects, albeit against a background of careful conceptual
distinction.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA
Studying the implicitly self-specifying processes that are involved
in perception, action, emotion, and cognition might also be inter-
esting from a clinical perspective, as it could shed light on the
neural correlates of disorders of the self, such as those occurring in
patients suffering from schizophrenia. Recent research on schiz-
ophrenia suggests that both self-consciousness (in the sense of
representing oneself) and the general structure of consciousness
as such can be altered in patients suffering from this disorder.
Phenomenologically inclined authors have recently suggested
that schizophrenia is an ipseity disturbance, or self-disorder, which
manifests itself in both altered forms of self-awareness, as well
as altered forms of consciousness more generally. Put differently,
schizophrenia seems to affect both the “world-directed” and “self-
directed” aspects of consciousness. As Sass and Parnas (2003)
put it:
“[. . .] this ipseity disturbance has two fundamental and com-
plementary aspects or components. The first is hyperreflex-
ivity, which refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness
in which a subject or agent experiences itself, or what would
normally be inhabited as an aspect or feature of itself, as
a kind of external object. The second is a diminishment
of self-affection or auto-affection—that is, of the sense of
4The notion of self-specifying processes and their relevance for self-consciousness
is also discussed at length by, for example, Bermúdez (1998) and Vosgerau (2009).
basic self-presence, the implicit sense of existing as a vital
and self-possessed subject of awareness.” (p. 428)
This is to say that patients suffering from schizophrenia seem to
direct an unusual amount of attention toward aspects of their self
that are normally not explicitly represented – the self becomes
objectified, rather than being part of the subjective experience
of engaging with the world. At the same time, the experience of
oneself as a subject seems in some sense diminished or reduced.
And further, these “complementary distortions are necessarily
accompanied by certain kinds of alterations or disturbances of
the subject’s ‘grip’ or ‘hold’ on the conceptual or perceptual field”
(Sass and Parnas, 2003), suggesting that it is not just the conscious
experience of oneself that is altered, but also more generally the
conscious experience of the world. Put differently, the very struc-
ture of consciousness as such seems to be affected. The fact that
ipseity disturbances in schizophrenia affect both how the world in
general is experienced as well as leading to specific aspects of the
self entering into the focus of attention is also stressed by Sass et al.
(2011).
If this analysis of schizophrenia as an ipseity disturbance is
right, and if, furthermore, Legrand and Ruby (2009) and Christoff
et al. (2011) are right in stressing the role of implicitly self-
specifying processes in various types of conscious experience,
then it stands to reason that it is precisely these processes that
are affected in schizophrenia. Accordingly, further study of these
processes and their potential relation to ipseity disturbances in
schizophrenia – in particular disturbances of the general struc-
ture of consciousness – could help to make progress in under-
standing the causes of schizophrenia. While some studies have
already begun to address the relation between abnormal CMS
function and abnormal self-reflection in schizophrenia (van der
Meer et al., 2010), as well as with faulty interpretation of social
events, which, in turn, might contribute to the development of
delusions (Holt et al., 2011), it would be worthwhile to fur-
ther investigate both the link between abnormal CMS function
and abnormal self-reflection, as well as the link between abnor-
malities in implicitly self-specifying processes (independent of
processes of self-reflection that are being linked to CMS) and
ipseity disturbances.
Indeed, Christoff et al. (2011) mention two paradigmatic cases
of such self-specifying processes, namely cognitive control and
emotion regulation. They also point to various brain regions
thought to be associated with these processes, in particular the
lateral PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and dorsal ACC (for cognitive
control and explicit emotional regulation), and the rostral ACC
(rACC), subgenual ACC, and vmPFC (for implicit emotional reg-
ulation). It would be interesting to see whether these brain areas
show a different pattern of activation in patients suffering from
schizophrenia.
THE ROLE OF PHENOMENOLOGY
However, such an endeavor also requires careful conceptual and
phenomenological analysis. As we have seen above, the study of the
self is multi-faceted and one needs to be careful in detailing which
aspect of the self or self-awareness one is intending to study and
in showing that the paradigms employed do indeed capture the
specific aspect or phenomenon in question. Phenomenology can
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help with such an analysis. Indeed, as various authors (e.g., Varela,
1996; Gallagher, 1997; Sass and Parnas, 2006; Thompson, 2007;
Sass et al., 2011) have pointed out, the relation between phenom-
enology and cognitive neuroscience can be seen as being mutually
constraining. This means that phenomenological analysis can pro-
vide part of the data set that neuroscientific theorizing needs to
take into account. After all, a neuroscientific study of self and self-
awareness cannot succeed without an understanding of what it is
that one wants to explain, and phenomenology – as the study of
the structure of awareness (including self-awareness) – can pro-
vide this understanding. At the same time, neuroscience can also
provide data that challenge established ways of thinking about
phenomenology, thus providing impulse for new ways of con-
ceptualizing aspects of conscious experience. An example for this
might be a case in which neuroscience highlights the involvement
of distinct neurobiological systems in a type of experience that
was previously analyzed as being unified. While this result need
not necessarily lead to a change in the analysis of the conscious
phenomenon in question (because one cannot simply assume that
all aspects of subpersonal level processing are reflected at the per-
sonal level; see below), it can prompt further reflection that might
ultimately reveal the phenomenon to be more complex than was
previously thought (Sass et al., 2011).
To put the interaction between phenomenology and cogni-
tive neuroscience into more concrete terms, one way (initially
suggested by Varela, 1996) in which this interplay between phe-
nomenology and neuroscience can be put into practice is by asking
participants to describe their experiences by means of open-ended
questionnaires, so as to avoid the imposition of pre-established
theoretical categories. The resulting descriptions must then be val-
idated intersubjectively in order to be usable for the interpretation
of correlated measurements of brain activity and/or behavior (Sass
et al., 2011, p. 5). At the same time, neuroscientific findings, for
example the discovery of distinct systems underlying the experi-
ence of what appears to be a unified phenomenon, can motivate
further investigation into the correct phenomenological analysis
(Sass et al., 2011)5.
Another way of incorporating phenomenology into cognitive
neuroscience is by relying on results from philosophical phe-
nomenology (that is, on a philosophical analysis of the phenom-
enology of certain experiences, rather than on interviews with
participants), and to employ these in order to inform the set-up
of experiments. This is called “phenomenological front-loading”
(Gallagher, 2003). Again, the methodology is not to be seen as
a “one-way-street” – rather, there should be a dynamic interplay
between phenomenological analysis and preliminary trials in the
process of establishing the best experimental paradigm.
The emphasis on the need for such a two-way exchange between
philosophy and neuroscience brings us to the third part of this
paper, namely the relation between personal and subpersonal level
explanations.
5For a detailed open-ended questionnaire along those lines, which has been devel-
oped on the basis of self-descriptions obtained from patients suffering from schiz-
ophrenia for the study of anomalous self-experience (see Parnas et al., 2005). For a
discussion of how phenomenology could be incorporated into the study of auditory
verbal hallucinations in particular (see McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013).
THE PERSONAL AND THE SUBPERSONAL IN
NEUROIMAGING THE SELF
At the personal level we refer to a person’s conscious experi-
ence and mental states, for example in order to make intelligible
the behavior of a person by providing the reasons the person
might have for acting in the way that they do. Subpersonal level
explanations on the other hand provide information about the
physiological or computational enabling conditions of personal-
level phenomena. Properties at the subpersonal level are nei-
ther conscious, nor do they make reference to mental states or
reasons.
Clearly, talk about the self and self-awareness is talk about
personal-level phenomena. Likewise, phenomenological analyses
are situated at the personal level – the level of the subject’s expe-
rience (or phenomenology). Brain imaging results, on the other
hand, are situated at the subpersonal level.
It is important to keep these two levels separate in order to
avoid the mistake of ascribing properties to one level that only
belong to the other. For example, we can only properly ascribe
conscious mental states to the person, not to parts of the per-
son, such as the brain (or areas within the brain) (Bennett and
Hacker, 2003). Likewise, as we have seen above, although there
are implicitly self-specifying processes that form part of the cog-
nitive mechanisms enabling the perception of and interaction
with the environment, we cannot simply assume that the infor-
mation contained in these processes is explicitly represented at
the personal level. Rather, there are good reasons to think that
in basic forms of perception and action the self is not explic-
itly represented (Musholt, 2013). Moreover, while the personal
level is amenable to appeals to reason, the subpersonal level is not
reasons-responsive.
If this is so, how should we think about the relation between
personal and subpersonal level explanations?
There are three different ways of conceptualizing this rela-
tionship. First, personal-level phenomena can simply be cor-
related with subpersonal level phenomena without this imply-
ing either a causal or a constitutive relationship. On this view,
neuroimaging studies can only provide us with information
about the neural correlates of the self and self-awareness. Sec-
ond, subpersonal level explanations can give us information
about the causes or enabling conditions of personal-level phe-
nomena. On this view, neuroscience can reveal the causes of
certain personal-level phenomena, but it doesn’t tell us any-
thing about what these phenomena really are. Third, subper-
sonal level explanations can enter into the constitutive con-
ditions of personal-level phenomena. That is, they can enter
into a conceptual understanding of what a specific phenomenon
consists in.
Some philosophers (e.g., McDowell, 1994; Hornsby, 1997,
2000) have argued that the personal and the subpersonal are
autonomous levels of explanation, and that information about
subpersonal level processes can at best provide us with knowl-
edge about the (causal) enabling mechanisms of personal-level
phenomena, but it cannot tell us anything about the constitutive
conditions of the latter. This is because personal-level explana-
tions – explanations that proceed by reference to a person’s con-
scious mental states and their reasons for doing something – are
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of a distinct kind, so that it would be a mistake to try to com-
bine such explanations with explanations of a very different kind,
such as those that operate at the subpersonal level. While one
type of explanation appeals to how things ought to be, by means
of appealing to reasons, the other explains how things happen to
be, by means of appeal to nomological generalizations (Hornsby,
1997; Shea, 2013).
Put differently, on this view, explanations that refer to reasons
are constitutive of personal-level explanations. And since we can-
not appeal to reasons at the subpersonal level, facts about what
goes on at the subpersonal level cannot enter into explanations as
to what constitutes personal-level phenomena (Colombo, 2013).
As Hornsby puts it: “a study of the mechanisms of neural trans-
mission won’t help in understanding what a person’s intentionally
doing something consists in” (2000, p. 16; cited in Colombo, 2013,
emphasis mine).
However, other philosophers (Colombo, 2013, Shea, 2013) have
recently argued that even if the mental cannot be reduced to
the neurobiological (and it seems plausible that it cannot), there
might still be ways in which information about subpersonal level
processes can contribute constitutive conditions for personal-level
phenomena.
How so? Basically, according to Colombo (2013), such an inter-
action would be based on what Churchland (1986) has termed a
co-evolutionary conception of the relationship between different
explanatory levels. Such a co-evolution“ involves explanations and
concepts at one level being susceptible to correction, reconceptu-
alization, and sometimes elimination, in light of discoveries and
conceptual refinements at other levels” (Colombo, 2013, p. 6).
This approach is exemplified by the aforementioned two-way-
interaction between phenomenological and neuroscientific analy-
sis, where neuroscientific results might in some case motivate the
re-examination of phenomenological analysis, even if they cannot
in and of themselves force a phenomenological redescription. If,
based on neurobiological findings, we arrive at a different concep-
tualization of what a certain conscious experience really is, then,
so it seems, this information will have made a contribution as to
what constitutes the experience in question. After all, according
to Hornsby and McDowell, a constitutive explanation provides
us with an account of what a personal-level phenomenon, such
as a person doing something intentionally consists in. Thus, an
appeal to subpersonal mechanisms might – in certain circum-
stances – help us explain both the presence and break down of
personal-level phenomena in ways that go beyond correlation (or
even causation).
A concrete example for such an interaction that is discussed by
Colombo (2013) involves the cases of addiction, pathological gam-
bling, and “sex addiction.” At the personal level, both pathological
gambling and“sex addiction” seem similar in the relevant respects;
accordingly, one might classify them as instantiating the same
phenomenon, namely a type of addiction. However, as Colombo
points out, there is evidence suggesting that addiction has a partic-
ular neurocomputational signature. In particular, addiction seems
to involve the engagement of the so-called “reward-system,” which
relies on computations based on dopamine activity. In the case
of addiction, an increased flow of dopamine into the reward-
system leads to a loss of inhibition or impulse, thereby granting
the system increased influence over the subject’s behavior. As a
result,
“[. . .] the reward system simultaneously learns to pursue a
target obsessively and increases the relative valuation of stim-
uli that predict it. . .. [It systematically pulls] attention back
toward the addictive target, and away from the alternative
motivators on which cortical systems are trying to focus.”
(Ross, 2010, p. 138; cited in Colombo, 2013, p. 17)6
Now, as Colombo (2013) further points out, pathological gam-
bling seems to share this neurocomputational signature. “Sex
addiction,” on the other hand, doesn’t seem to involve the kind
of changes to the dopaminergic reward-system observed in both
addiction and pathological gambling (Ross et al., 2010). Moreover,
the subpersonal facts about the neurocomputational mechanisms,
in conjunction with what we know about gambling help us to
understand while gambling can become addictive: it allows for
perfect control over the cues that are predictive of reward (such a
pressing a button on a slot machine), while providing no control
over actual reward-contingencies (the actual winning of money).
Neither of these features seems to be present when it comes to
sex. Consequently, according to Colombo, while an understanding
of the neurocomputational mechanisms of addiction helps us to
understand pathological gambling as a form of addiction, the same
cannot be said about “sex addiction.” Thus, it seems to be wrong
to describe a certain type of behavior as a case of addiction to
sex – knowledge about the mechanisms of addiction together with
knowledge about the subpersonal processes that underlie gam-
bling and “sex addiction” suggests that the label “sex addiction”
constitutes a conceptual mistake. We can thus see that knowl-
edge about subpersonal facts can form part of the constitutive (or
conceptual) conditions for a personal-level phenomenon. This, in
turn, can have important theoretical as well as practical implica-
tions, for instance in terms of developing treatments (Colombo,
2013).
A second example that is would like to consider, which is dis-
cussed by Shea (2013), refers us back to the importance of the
cognitive neuroscience of the self and self-awareness. Consider
again the implicit self-specifying mechanisms that are involved
in perception, action, emotion, and cognition mentioned above.
I have suggested above that a break down in these mechanisms
might contribute to some of the symptoms associated with schiz-
ophrenia. In fact, it has recently been suggested that certain positive
symptoms, such as auditory hallucinations or the loss of a sense
of agency might be due to such a break down (Fletcher and Frith,
2009; Shea, 2013). In particular, the idea is that such symptoms can
be traced back to changes in the way in which representations of
the world are updated by error signals (which are, in turn, linked to
abnormal dopamine neurotransmission). As we have seen above,
self-specifying processes are generally explained in terms of a com-
parator model that distinguishes between afferent signals arising
6But notice that the gambling need not be experienced as rewarding by the patient
at the personal-level. In fact, it is precisely one of the hallmarks of addiction that
patients themselves would like to stop the behavior in question, but find themselves
being unable to do so, due to the subpersonal processes driving the behavior. So
again, it is important to keep personal and subpersonal level explanations separate,
even though there can be fruitful interaction between them.
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as a result of the organism’s own efferent processes (i.e., reafference
signals) and afferent signals arising as a result of environmental
events (i.e., exafference signals). Now, one hypothesis is that, say,
in the case of auditory hallucinations, the mechanism that nor-
mally distinguishes between one’s own voice and that of another
by means of such a comparison is impaired, such that the patient
is no longer able to reliably tell the difference between the voices
generated by others and their own inner speech. Normally, inner
speech is predictable based on the subject’s belief and other men-
tal states (in contrast to the speech of others). However, so the
hypothesis, in the case of a break down of the normal compara-
tor mechanism, the patient might receive a prediction-error signal
when engaging in inner speech, which would lead them to con-
clude that the voice must have been generated by someone else
(Shea, 2013).
Notice that this model is still controversial. However, we do
not need to be concerned here with whether this is indeed an
accurate model for the explanation of certain positive symptoms
in schizophrenia. Rather, what matters for our present purposes
is the point that if such a subpersonal level model could be
established, it would go some way to explain what clearly is a
personal-level phenomenon, such as the experience of auditory
hallucinations. In particular, as Shea (2013) suggests, it might
go some way in explaining why some of the features that are
normally associated with the personal level, namely the rational
connections between various mental states, break down. After all,
according to this model, it is the very subpersonal mechanisms
that normally enable an accurate representation of and rational
response to evidence that are hypothesized to be affected, thereby
explaining why such a rational response is no longer possible.
Accordingly,
“[. . .] if a patient’s experience of hearing voices can be
explained by a pathology in the subpersonal mechanisms
that constitute the normal capacity for responding to evi-
dence in rational ways, then we again have a subpersonal
factor that is more than just an external cause of the per-
sonal level phenomenon. It is part of the constitutive basis
of that phenomenon. But because it is operating abnormally,
the nature of the personal level phenomenon itself changes.”
(Shea, 2013, p. 17, emphasis added)
Thus, not only can knowledge about brain mechanisms be impor-
tant in order to develop a causal understanding of (thereby con-
tributing to the creation of better treatments of) pathological
experiences and behaviors, but it can also contribute to the concep-
tual question as to what constitutes a specific phenomenon. This
includes phenomena related to the self, such as the ability to dis-
tinguish between one’s own voice and those of others (or between
one’s inner speech and the perception of the speech of others). Of
course, this leaves open whether knowledge about cognitive pro-
cessing in CMS does likewise have the potential to enter into the
constitutive conditions for self-reflection.
It is important to be clear that localization studies as such
remain at the level of correlating personal and subpersonal level
phenomena. If we want to move beyond correlations and toward
knowledge of causal, or even constitutive conditions, we need
information about the specific mechanisms involved in bringing
about personal-level phenomena. That is to say, we need functional
(e.g., neurocomputational) analyses. Although they themselves
cannot provide information about mechanisms, localization stud-
ies can provide an important first step in this direction because
once we have identified the areas that are activated in certain cog-
nitive processes, we can begin to develop hypotheses about their
specific functional roles and the computational mechanisms that
enable them to fulfill these roles.
CONCLUSION
The leading question of this Research Topic was “Why and how
is the self related to the brain midline regions?” As we have seen,
while there is evidence to suggest that CMS do indeed play a priv-
ileged role in self-related processing, we have also seen that there
is reason to doubt that the self is strictly speaking “located” in the
CMS. This is because the CMS can also be shown to be involved in
non-self-related cognitive tasks, while self-related processing also
seems to involve brain areas outside of the CMS. Moreover, we
have seen that it might not make much sense the speak of “the
self” as such to begin with, as the notion of self and self-awareness
is complex and multi-faceted.
Indeed, there are several philosophical distinctions that can
be made with regard to the self and self-experience. This article
focused on one of these, namely the distinction between being a
self (i.e., being a subject of conscious experience) and being self-
aware (i.e., being able to think about oneself), where the latter is
closely tied to the ability to think about others. In addition, we
saw that one can distinguish between thinking about oneself “as
subject” (in the first-person mode) and “as object” (in the third-
person mode). It was shown that studies of the relation between
CMS and the self tend to focus on the ability to think about oneself,
while neglecting the more basic aspects of being a self. Moreover,
the sense of self-representation targeted in these studies seems to
be mostly the sense of thinking of oneself “as object.” It was sug-
gested that it might be worthwhile to target the distinction between
thinking of oneself “as subject” and thinking of oneself “as object”
in future studies to see whether this distinction is reflected in the
neurobiology.
In addition, it was suggested that while the more basic aspects
of being a self might not possess any particular relation to the
CMS, it would nevertheless be wrong to restrict the cognitive neu-
roscience of the self to the ability to think about oneself, not least
because a better understanding of the more basic aspects of being
a self (i.e., certain aspects of conscious experience in general, such
as the perspectivalness of conscious experience) might be impor-
tant for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as
schizophrenia.
It was further argued that in the pursuit of the study of the
self and self-awareness, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy
(in particular phenomenology) ought to work together.
Finally, it was shown with the help of two examples that while
it is important to respect the distinction between the personal and
the subpersonal, knowledge about subpersonal level processes can
potentially contribute to a reconceptualization of personal-level
phenomena, including those that are related to the self. However,
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this leaves open whether a particular pattern of activation in
CMS can be considered part of the constitutive basis of being
in a state of self-awareness. What the discussion about the rela-
tion between the personal and the subpersonal also shows is that
in order for there to be a fruitful interaction between different
levels of explanation, we need not only careful conceptual and
phenomenological analysis, but also an understanding of cogni-
tive mechanisms, which must go beyond facts about patterns of
activation. That is to say that we need a functional analysis of
subpersonal level processes. Localization studies can provide an
important first step toward such a functional analysis, but they are
not in and of themselves sufficient.
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